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Introduction
The identification, assessment, and mitigation of risk in complex systems are challenging tasks. Risk analysis is 
often used in complex systems to reduce the probability of negative events occurring in such systems, and to 
enhance the decisions made under uncertain conditions (Clemons & Simmons, 1998). The conventional risk 
analysis framework includes three sub-components: assessment of risk, management of risk, and communication 
of risk (Codex, 2007). Mapping the risk analysis process within a specific system allows for the identification of the 
most high-stakes hazards, allowing an efficient application of management and mitigation activities (Clemons & 
Simmons, 1998; Stamatelatos et al., 2002).
One example of a complex system is one which processes bulk materials such as grain. The bulk materials 
handling system is becoming more complex than previously, with evolving production practices, changing 
customer demands, and increased legislative requirements (Thakur, Wang, & Hurburgh, 2010). Little emphasis 
has been given in current and previous research on use of risk analysis in these systems (Kingman & Field, 2005). 
Therefore, the focus of this paper is to provide an overview of risk tools that can be used in the bulk materials 
environment, to discuss the ability of the risk tools to measure hazards quantitatively, and to recommend 
appropriate usage within the bulk materials handling industry. Implications for managers on the interpretation of 
information generated by risk analysis tools will conclude the paper. 
Risk Analysis Framework
Most risk analysis tools are based on the assumption that risk is calculated by considering both the probability 
of exposure or occurrence to the hazard and the consequence or severity of the hazard. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) are two risk mapping tools that may be used to identify and assess the risks in a 
system. Both require the analyst to identify the events involved that may lead to a specific undesirable outcome 
or condition (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). Fault tree analysis and event tree analysis 
use probability data derived from experimental means or as determined by expert panels (Stamatelatos et al., 
2002; Vesely, Goldberg, Roberts, & Haasl, 1981). Probability data are used to quantitatively estimate the likelihood 
that events will occur and if they do occur, what the consequence of the event will be. Events with a high 
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probability of exposure, but a low severity are judged to be a low risk, while events with a high probability of 
exposure and a high severity are considered to be high-risk situations. 
Once hazards are identified and assessed, risk assessment matrices can be used to provide guidance on the 
management of risk within a system (U.S. Department of Defense [U.S. DoD], 2012). Risk assessment matrices 
provide a repeatable method of identifying the impact of a given risk by providing a scale to judge the 
occurrence and consequence of an event.  Experts normally determine categories within the matrix.  A risk 
management team with extensive knowledge in the related field is often tapped to construct a risk assessment 
matrix (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; ioMosaic Corporation, 2009). 
Using FTA and ETA provides an analyst or manager with the associated probability of occurrence for a given 
event. When the probability of an event is known, risk can be calculated by crossing the probability of occurrence 
with the consequences or benefits of that event. The calculation of risk by crossing the probability of occurrence 
with the consequence or benefit is a quantitative value that can be used for comparison of alternatives, such as a 
specific set of countermeasures to reduce the risk involved. For managerial decisions, the risk assessment matrix 
can be used to determine the acceptability of risks and whether action should be taken to reduce the risk of a 
given event.  
Event Tree Analysis
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a technique used to visually identify and evaluate the causal pathway that follows an 
initiating event (Ericson, 2005). ETA is based on binary logic, where the event occurs or does not. Because there 
is no partial failure or success, ETA provides a valuable assessment of the probability of occurrence for negative 
events (The Institution of Engineering Technology, 2010). ETA evaluates all possible paths following an initiating 
event that leads to an outcome and its corresponding probability of occurrence (Ericson, 2005), with each 
“branch” illustrating the probability for one specific event pathway. The ETA output, which reflects the probability 
of occurrence, is then paired with information on the consequence of the occurrence to calculate risk involved in 
the system being investigated. Although ETA represents a very powerful and useful calculation, populating the 
“branches” with accurate probabilities can be a major challenge for analysts in that other analysis tools may need 
to be used to do so (Ericson, 2005; Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). 
An example of an event tree in Figure 1 starts with the initiating event at the leftmost part of the event tree 
where branches stem from it in a success versus failure logic. Following the top tier successes to the success 
outcome A, there is a calculation required to quantify the probability of the outcome. Under success outcome A 
Equation 1 can be used to provide the probability for the success outcome A. To arrive at success outcome A the 
system is mapped so that events one through 4 must occur successfully to reach outcome A. 
P(A)=(P(IE)) (P(1s)) (P(2s)) (P(3s)) (P(4s)),              (1)
281
2014 ATMAE Conference Proceedings 
 www.atmae.org
where
P(A)=The probability of event A; P(IE)=The probability of the initiating event; P(Xs)=The probability of 
success event X.
Figure 1 Example Event Tree
Observation of the failure outcome B shows that the path has changed only at event 4, which ultimately leads 
to a failed outcome. The calculation of failure outcome B follows the same procedure as for success outcome A 
except that the last quantity in the equation, P(4s), must now be changed to P(4f ) to reflect the failure of event 4. 
This minor change in the process results in a system failure. To calculate the probability of failure in this case, the 
P(B) is calculated in Equation 2. 
P(B)=(P(IE)) (P(1s)) (P(2s)) (P(3s)) (P(4f )),                 (2)
where
P(B) = The probability of event B; P(IE) = The probability of the initiating event; P(Xs)=The probability of 
success event X; P(Xf )=The probability of failure event X.
282
2014 ATMAE Conference Proceedings 
 www.atmae.org
Single point failures are critical to identify because there are no mitigating or intervening events to prevent the 
failure. A situation without any intermediate events to prevent the failure of the system if a single event occurs 
can be seen in the equation for outcome F.  Equation 3 shows that there are fewer terms, resulting in a larger 
probability, given that in the multiplication of probabilities using decimals, the more terms in the equation the 
smaller the probability will be (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004).
P(F)=(P(IE))(P(1f )),                (3)
where
P(F)=The probability of event F; P(IE) = The probability of the initiating event; P(Xf )=The probability of 
failure event X.
Finally, to calculate the overall probability of failure and success for the system, failure outcomes and success 
outcomes are added together from their respective domains.  Because event trees are binary, the outcomes are 
an “or” statement, meaning that no two or more outcomes can occur at the same time. 
Event tree analysis has the potential to address existing difficulties of measuring the risk in the bulk materials 
supply chain. One advantage of ETA is that it will output both successes and failures generated from the initiating 
event, allowing the analyst to simultaneously operate in and compare both the success and failure domain 
(Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Ericson, 2005; Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). 
In the bulk materials system, there is a demand for both a high quality and sustainable product (Thakur, Wang, 
& Hurburgh, 2009). In order to provide information on supply chain risks requested by selected customers, ETA 
can identify the successes and failures related to the quality and sustainability aspects in bulk materials handling. 
ETA can also identify where in the process the failures and successes are most likely to occur. When applied to 
the complex task of tracing and tracking bulk products, (Thakur et al., 2009), ETA allows complex systems to 
be modeled in a relatively straightforward manner. This allows analysts to examine each causal pathway for 
mitigation points (Ericson, 2005; Clemons & Simmons, 1998). 
Finally, ETA allows for the insertion of potential mitigation strategies into the model to determine the 
effectiveness of the countermeasures on the risk before any investment is made in the mitigation method 
(Clemons & Simmons, 1998). This helps to balance the cost of managing quality and safety in a system with a very 
low profit margin. 
As with most tools, there are limitations to ETA that may present difficulties when used with bulk materials 
handling. One limitation of ETA is that the initiating event and the causal pathway that follows must be known by 
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the analyst, which requires analysts to have training and experience in the context being studied (Ericson, 2005; 
Clemons & Simmons, 1998). Because of the complexity of the bulk materials system, (Golan et al., 2004; Thakur 
et al., 2009) it may be difficult to find analysts who both understand the system and are involved enough with its 
causal pathways to make valid probability estimates. 
A lack of understating or experience with the system may result in difficulty identifying initiating events that 
would ultimately lead to an under-analyzed and incomplete assessment of the system. To address a system that 
has multiple initiating events, an event tree must be constructed for each event (Clemons & Simmons, 1998), 
a time-consuming process. Finally, ETA can only describe a failure or success; there are no partial successes or 
failures. For this reason, it is possible to overlook subtle dependencies within the system while modeling (Ericson, 
2005). Expert knowledge of the system can limit the influence of these limitations on the final ETA, but it is a key 
consideration when using the process. 
Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) works in reverse of ETA, starting the logic system at a specific failure and working 
backward to find the contributing factors. FTA graphically displays a systematic description of how components 
of a system could align and lead to an undesirable outcome, termed “the top event” (The Institution of 
Engineering Technology, 2012). Fault trees are constructed from the failure (the top event) towards each basic 
causal event until the desired level of detail is reached or until the system events cannot be broken down any 
further (Lindhe, Rosen, Norberg, & Bergstedt, 2009). 
Like the ETA, FTA is a binary system, but, unlike the success and failure branches used by ETAs, fault trees use 
logic gates. Examples of logic statements used in FTA are shown in Figure 2.  Data used to populate an FTA may 
be qualitative, quantitative, or both, depending on the analyst’s goal (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). The output from 
a FTA can provide information to analysts that facilitate managerial decision-making regarding the priority of 
mitigation tasks (Stamatelatos et al., 2002). 
284
2014 ATMAE Conference Proceedings 
 www.atmae.org
1. Identify undesirebale top 
event.
2. Identify First level of 
contributing events.
3. Link contributers to top 
event by logic gates.
4. Identify second level of 
contributing events.
5. Link second level of 
contributers to top event by 
6. Repeat until the desired 
level of detail is reached 
Figure 2. Example of a Fault Tree Analysis
Because fault trees are constructed with logic gates, specific symbols are used to identify different components 
of the tree.  These are shown in Table 1 (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Rausand & Hoyland). Figure 2 displays an 
example of a fault tree where the top event is the first item listed, followed by a logic gate (which can be an “and” 
or an “or” gate) and then proceeds to the first tier events. First tier events are events that happen just before the 
top event, likewise with second tier events that occur just before the first tier events and so on. 
This path of logic gates and events will continue to repeat, branching out, until the desired level of detail or basic 
events, as defined in Table 1, have been reached. Just as with event trees, fault trees can also identify single point 
failures. A single point failure in fault tree will display a basic event connected directly to the top event with an 
“or” gate. Calculations in FTA are similar to those of ETA, but use additional algebra to compute probabilities as 
described by multiple authors (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; The Institution of Engineering Technology, 2012).
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Table 1. Basic FTA Symbols
Symbol Name Description
Event                                 
(Top or Intermediate)
Top Event- this is the main undesirable event 
under analysis.  Intermediate Event- This 
describes a condition produced by proceeding 
events.
Basic Event
An initiating fault or failure that cannot be 
developed further. These events are 
determined from the precision of the analysis.
AND Gate
Output occur only if all connected inputs 
exist.
Inclusive OR Gate
Output will occur if one or more of the 
connected inputs exist. 
Fault tree analysis can have several advantages in process-based systems, such as the bulk materials supply 
chain. One advantage of FTA is that it can enable the analyst to assess both the probability of failure from several 
pathways as well as single point failures within a complex system (Clemons & Simmons, 1998). Similar to ETA, this 
assessment allows for the identification of potential system weaknesses while allowing the analyst to identify 
specific changes that could reduce system vulnerability (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). 
Fault tree analysis works well in complex systems, such as the bulk materials handling system, to identify 
vulnerabilities within the system. The structure of a fault tree also gives a good framework for analysts to 
understand a systems-related cause of failure, but the analysis is dependent on careful construction and good 
input data. If these are not in place, the analysis will be flawed (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004).
FTA has limitations similar to ETA relating to knowledge of the system. It is crucial to the success of FTA that these 
limitations are heeded by the analyst for a successful assessment of the system. One disadvantage of FTA is that it 
focuses on one main top event or failure, which can result in a troublesome assessment if the outcome or causal 
pathways leading to the event are not known (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Stamatelatos et al., 2002). 
As in ETA, bulk materials handling systems are complex (Golan et al., 2004; Thakur et al., 2009) and require 
analysts that are experienced and understand the system and its causal pathways as a whole to make valid 
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probability estimates. Because the fault tree leads from the top event to basic event components, good data 
such as the failure rate of each component must be accurate for the tree to be useful in calculating accurate risk 
(Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Rausand & Hoyland, 2004). 
Some systems are understood very well and have extensive tracing and track while other systems are less precise 
(Golan et al., 2004). Populating FTA with data from thoroughly tracked systems would likely be more successful 
than in the systems that are not precisely tracked (Laux & Hurburgh, 2010; Mosher, Laux, & Hurburgh, 2009). In 
other words, if bad data or poor analyses are used in FTA, the outcome will be flawed and poor decisions may 
result. Finally, each event under each logic gate must be independent of one another and each event must be 
an immediate contributor to the next, as displayed in Figure 2 (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; Rausand & Hoyland, 
2004). In a complex system such as bulk materials handling, system dependencies may not always follow a causal 
pathway, which can be problematic in estimating risk. 
Risk Assessment Matrix
The third tool discussed is the risk assessment matrix. The risk assessment matrix (RAM) is a presentation of 
potential exposures or occurrence and potential severities or consequences that, when considered together, 
identify the level of risk for a given scenario. The matrix is used to conduct a subjective assessment from the 
data that an analyst or manager has available (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; U.S. DoD, 2012). The risk assessment 
matrix is derived from risk curves, which are a plotted curve of probability and severity. Defining distinct cut off 
points to develop categories of risk make the decision making process more clearly defined with pre-determined 
areas of risk acceptance. (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; U.S. DoD, 2012). Risk assessment matrices are a simple and 
straightforward way to define what is acceptable or not for a given scenario. It allows managers or analysts to 
make relatively quick decision choices based on pre-defined acceptable levels of risk in the RAM. Common matrix 
categories evaluate the likelihood of occurrence and consequence on areas such human injury, environmental 
damage, monetary loss, and work time lost as a result of the event (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; ioMosaic 
Corporation, 2009; U.S. DoD, 2012).
The first piece of a RAM is the probability levels with a subjective definition. Table 2 shows an example 
from Clemons and Simmons (1998).  The second piece of a RAM is the level of severity for different targets. The 
levels of severity can be adjusted to fit specific applications so that the levels are not too broad or precise. Levels 
can range from catastrophic to negligible. Table 3 shows an example from Clemons and Simmons (1998). The 
two categorical levels of probability and severity are combined to form a matrix from which risk levels can be 
determined, as shown in Figure 3 (Clemons & Simmons, 1998).
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Table 2.  Example of Severity Levels for Multiple Targets
Severity 
Category Personnel Injury
Equipment 
Loss Product Loss
Down 
Time Environmental Effect
I    
Catastrophic Death
Greater than 
1 million 
dollars
Greater than 1 
million dollars
More 
than 4 
months
Long-term ( more than 5 years) 
damage cost greater than 1 
million dollars to correct
II
 Critical
Severe 
injury or 
illness
250 thousand 
to 1 million 
dollars
250 thousand 
to 1 million 
dollars
2 
weeks 
to 4 
months 
Medium-term (1-5 years) damage 
cost between 250 thousand to 1 
million dollars to correct
III        
Marginal
Minor 
injury or 
illness
1 thousand to 
250 thousand 
dollars
1 thousand to 
250 thousand 
dollars
1 day 
to 2 
weeks
Short-term (1 Year) damage cost 
between 1 thousand to 250 
thousand dollars to correct
IV    
Negligible
No Injury 
or illness
less than 1 
thousand 
dollars
less than 1 
thousand 
dollars
less 
than 1 
day
Minor (readily repairable) damage 
cost less than 1 thousand dollars 
to correct
Table 3. Example of Probability Levels
Probability
Level Description Definition
A Frequent Likely to occur repeatedly in a system life cycle
B Probable Likely to occur multiple times in a system life cycle
C Occasional Likely to occur sometime in a system life cycle
D Remote Not likely to occur in a system life cycle, but possible
E Improbable probability of occurrence cannot be distinguished from zero
F Impossible Physically impossible to occur
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Probability
F   
Impossible
E   
Improbable
D     
Remote C Occasional
B 
Probable A    Frequent
Se
ve
rit
y 
O
f 
Co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
I      
Catastrophic       1  
 
II             
Critical       2  
 
III         
Marginal     3    
 
IV       
Negligible          
 
 
1 Must suppress to a lower risk
2 Operation permissible for a short time with management signed waiver
3 Operation Permissible
Life Cycle n years
Figure 3.  Example Risk Assessment Matrix
One advantage of RAMs is that it can be used as a management tool with simple input data from an analyst. 
When using a RAM, a manager can decide which hazards generate the most risk within a system and make 
mitigation decisions accordingly (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; ioMosaic Corporation, 2009). Unlike FTA and ETA, 
RAM requires little experience to use. For this reason, it has the potential to prevent problems within the bulk 
materials handling system on a day-to-day basis, particularly when used with output data from experienced 
analysts.
Furthermore, the RAM is not specifically designed as a pre or post incident tool. Rather, it can be implemented 
during the design phase to reduce the risk in the system. It may even be implemented after a system is running 
to make decisions about mitigating the effects of current hazards (Clemons & Simmons, 1998; U.S. DoD, 2012). 
This allows bulk materials handing operations the flexibility to implement this before conducting business or 
during operation if the system has already been established. 
An important limitation of RAMs is that this tool does not identify the actual hazards or probabilities, therefore, 
it must be used in combination with other risk mapping tools to be successful in analyzing a system (Clemons 
& Simmons, 1998; ioMosaic Corporation, 2009). Additionally, without the valid data on the probability of 
occurrence or severity, this tool alone will be completely subjective. Though the RAM alone is not powerful 
enough in bulk materials handling, in combination with other tools it becomes a flexible tool to efficiently make 
decisions based on predetermined action levels without any professional experience. This tool is most useful for 
managers who are overseeing day-to-day operations and may encounter a situation that requires an assessment 
of risk involved before proceeding.  
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Potential Impact of Risk Mapping
As the management of bulk materials becomes more challenging, tools such as fault tree analysis, event tree 
analysis, and risk assessment matrix can perform a valuable role in estimating and measuring risk in these 
systems. Computer systems allow massive calculations and provide data that was difficult if not impossible 
to access. The tools can also be used to support decision-making, loss prevention, and worker safety within 
the process-based industries. Their adaptability and relatively straightforward design warrants their further 
investigation as a risk management tool and for continuous improvement purposes. Both have a high likelihood 
of providing value for existing systems as well as future bulk handling systems. 
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